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This paper examines the urban housing sector of China and proposes a 
property tax reform.  Over the past decade, housing price in urban China has been 
increasing dramatically because of strong demand for self-use, investment and 
speculation. The booming housing market, however, has brought several challenges 
for further development, such as housing affordability, inequality, and possible 
housing bubble. One strategy is to reform the current property tax system.  
Specifically, this paper proposes that China significantly reduces taxes in circulation 
but levies property tax during possession.  Doing so will increase housing 
affordability because of lower transaction costs, reduce speculation because of 
higher cost of holding, stabilize fiscal system because of more sustainable tax 
revenues, and improve the efficiency and fairness of the property tax system because 
of the implementation of “ability-to-pay” and “who use who pay” principles.    (JEL 




China’s urban housing price has been increasing dramatically for years 
driven by strong demand for self-use, investment  and  speculation.  A  big  imbalance 
of housing conditions exists between the rich and poor, causing social unsteadiness.  
Improper taxes and fees make housing price too high for the majority, especially 
those with average income or below.  Additionally, the overheating of housing 
market heats up its supportive industries such as metal and cement.  It has aroused 
the worries of the housing bubble and inflation.   
In order to reduce housing speculation and stabilize prices, policymakers 
have introduced a series of macro regulations during the recent three years.  For 
example, the State Council issued “Document 121” in June 2003 to regulate the 
financial policies related to real estate market developers, tightening the grant of 
construction  loans.  On  August  31
st 2004, the central government requested all local 
governments to stop leasing out public land under internal agreements.  All leases 
have to be implemented through open market process.  On March 16
th 2005, 
People’s Bank of China raised the mortgage interest rate.  On May 29
th 2005, the 
document of “Adjusting Housing Supply Structure and Stabilizing Housing Prices” 
was issued.  As a whole, macro regulations cover all aspects of real estate and its 
related industries, from financial to land system, for both sides of supply and 
demand.  
Macro regulation measures taken during the recent three years have worked, 
however, to a limited extent.  Opposite to policy makers’ expectations, housing 
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price keeps its momentum of increasing.  The  data  issued  by the National Bureau of 
Statistics of China and the National Development and Reform Commission on 
September 13
th 2006 show that housing price of August 2006 increased by 5.5 
percent on average nationwide compared to August 2005.  Among the 70 cities in 
the analysis, housing prices increased in 68 cities.  Macro regulations do not seem 
to take much effect on housing price.   
The necessity of finding an effective housing market regulation tool as well 
as saving local governments from future fiscal shortage makes it urgent for the 
Chinese government to reform the property tax system.  In this paper, we propose 
that China significantly reduces taxes in construction and transaction but levies 
property tax during possession.  Doing so will increase housing affordability 
because of lower transaction costs, reduce speculation because of higher cost of 
holding, stabilize fiscal system because of more sustainable tax revenues, and 
improve the efficiency and fairness of the property tax system because of the 
implementation of “ability-to-pay” and “who use who pay” principles.     
The structure of this paper is as follows.  Section II examines China’s 
current property tax system and its inefficiency.  Section III provides policy 
recommendations for property tax reform and discusses possible consequences of the 
reform.  Section  IV  concludes.   
 
II. PROPERTY TAX SYSTEM OF CHINA AND ITS INEFFICIENCY 
China’s current property tax system was formed after the general tax reform 
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in 1994, which established the Tax Sharing System between the central and 
provincial governments.  Real estate taxes and fees were classified as local taxes, 
collected and administered by local tax bureaus.  Local governments retain 100 
percent of all property tax revenue (Hong, 2005).    Since then, real estate taxes have 
become a significant part of local government revenue.   
Several unique features make China’s property tax system complicated and 
inefficient.  First, urban land in China is owned by the state and thus property 
owners only have the use right of land.  Because of the separation of land 
ownership and property ownership, the property owner needs to pay taxes 
respectively for both the property they own and the land they lease from the state, in 
the form of housing tax and urban and township land use tax.  The housing tax is 
implemented by “Provisional Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on 
House Property Tax Detailed Rules for Its Implementation,” promulgated on 
September 15
th 1986 by the State Council.
1  It is a tax levied on property’s 
acquisition value with a rate of 1.2 percent.    The urban and township land use tax is 
regulated by “Provisional Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Urban 
and Township Land Use Tax,” promulgated on September 27
th 1988 by the State 
Council.
2  It is a charge on using the land that belongs to the state, with tax rate 
being determined by each provincial government and varying among cities.  By 
definition, the housing tax and urban and township land use tax together are regarded 
as the real estate tax in China.   
Second, home buyers pay numerous taxes and fees during housing 
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transactions but not during possession (Song et al., 1999).    Therefore, home owners 
pay property taxes for only one time when they buy houses.    Taxes and fees include 
title tax (since June 1, 2005, it is 2 percent of the price for  houses less or equal to 
144 square meters and 4 percent for  houses larger than 144 square meters), 
contract stamp tax (5 RMB), certificate stamp tax (0.05 percent of the price), 
registration fee (80 RMB), certificate  of ownership fee (10 RMB), mapping fee 
(0.8 RMB per square meter), security appraisal fee (4 RMB per square meter), 
assessment fee (0.42 percent of the price), maintenance fee (2 to 3 percent of the 
price), termite protection fee (200 RMB per unit for houses below 50 square meters, 
300 RMB per unit for houses between 50 to 80 square meters, 400 RMB per unit for 
houses between 80 to 100 square meters, and 500 RMB per unit for houses over 100 
square meters).  For an average size house of 70 square meters at an average price 
level of 3,800 RMB per square meter, the transaction price is 266,000 RMB.  The 
minimum taxes and fees would be 15,281 RMB, which is 5.7 percent of the 
transaction price and about 72.8 percent of the 2006 average annual income of 
Chinese urban workers, which is 21,001 RMB.
3  
Third, the high property tax burden in urban China is largely invisible 
because it occurs mostly in the phase of construction and thus become part of the 
housing price, which is comprised of land-use fee, taxes and fees, construction cost 
and profit.  Estimated by Chinese housing bureau, land price plus tax and fee 
payment accounts for above 50 percent of housing price, construction cost accounts 
for 30-40 percent and profit takes the remaining 15 to 20 percent.
4  For example, 
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Table 1 shows house price composition in 2006 by using data of Xi’an, the city with 
an average national housing price.
5  
  
<INSERT TABLE 1 HERE> 
 
Land cost, which is a lump-sum leasehold charge that real estate developers 
pay to the government for acquiring land-use right of 70 years, represents 30 percent 
of housing price.    According to “Contract of Lease Use Right of State Land,” local 
governments share this revenue with the central government on a 70/30 split basis.
6  
Tax and fee payments together are about 20 percent of housing price.    Construction 
cost, accounting for about 30 percent, is relatively low compared with the case in 
America where construction cost accounts for 70 percent of housing price while land 
cost and profit account for about 20 percent and 10 percent of housing price, 
respectively (Zhang and Jiang, 2004).  It is also commonly accepted that the profit 
rate of Chinese real estate developers is well underestimated.  Revealed by a cost 
list of a newly built residential subdivision in Fuzhou City, profit represents 37 
percent of the housing price.
7  
According to An and Wang (2005), there are between 60 to 180 taxes and 
fees pertinent to real estate construction, varying across cities.  During land 
acquisition, 22 taxes and fees are levied, including leasehold charge which is rent for 
land use right, city infrastructure fee which is paid for infrastructure construction of 
the city, land management fee, relocation compensation, land title tax, and business 
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tax.  During construction, at least 20 taxes and fees are levied, including business 
tax, city maintenance and construction tax, education tax, and fees for facilities in 
the community such as road, water, gas, electricity, sewage, waste disposal, and 
parking lot.
8    Besides taxes and fees that are required by laws, there are many other 
fees charged by governments at different levels.  Some cities charged more than 
200 types of taxes and fees, with most not relevant to housing (Song et al., 1999).  
A survey in Shanghai, for example, shows that 115 taxes and fees are unnecessary 
(Lu, 1996).  It was estimated that, in 1998, all fees collected from real estate 
industry amounted to 120-150 billion RMB, while tax revenue from real estate 
industry    was only 45 billion RMB, about a third of all fee revenue (An and Wang, 
2005).  
The above features make the Chinese housing market and property tax 
system inefficient.   The high tax and fee cost, including the one time lump-sum 
land leasehold charge, dramatically increases the housing price, making urban 
housing unaffordable to average households.    House price to income ratio (P/I), the 
standard indicator of housing affordability, is defined as the ratio of median house 
price divided by median household income.  The higher this ratio is, the lower 
housing affordability becomes.  In 2005, the P/I ratio was 2.3 on average for the 
USA and 3.4 for the State of Nevada where the authors locate.
9  Table 2 presents 
P/I ratios for 37 major Chinese cities in 2004 based on average size of 70 square 
meters. 
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<INSERT TABLE 2 HERE> 
Almost all cities had P/I ratios higher than 5, with some exceeding 10 and an 
average of 7.3.  Actual P/I ratio would be much higher because most newly built 
houses are larger than 70 square meters.  No doubt, housing in urban China is too 
expensive relative to income.    In addition, paying all the taxes and fees one time in 
transaction increases the financial burden of home-buying.  It delays housing 
consumption and thus diminishes urban residents’ life-cycle welfare. 
Zero property tax during possession loses the role of property tax to adjust 
resource allocation.  One of the economic characteristics of a property tax is its 
capitalization of future cash flow into present housing price.  A high property tax 
would lower the present housing price and decrease the incentive for holding a 
property.  For speculators and investors, as the housing price increases, so do their 
property tax costs, which make the transaction less profitable and riskier.    Without a 
property tax, cost of holding a property is almost zero while the appreciation of 
house value over time can be fully realized.  It encourages speculation in housing 
markets and leads to inefficient use of residential property.  A direct way of 
observing this is the high housing vacancy rate.    See Beijing for instance, estimated 
by Chinese Ministry of  Construction, in 2005, 17 percent of residential house 
purchasing is aimed at investment, in which 48 percent is left vacant waiting for 
rising of house value.
10  Speculation not only causes a big waste of resources but 
also pushes up housing prices, which in turn harms ordinary urban residents and 
leads to serious imbalance of living conditions.   
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Potential fiscal insufficiency is another problem of China’s current property 
tax system.  As discussed in the review section, property tax serves as one of the 
most important taxes and contributes one-third of total revenue to state and local 
governments.  Because real property is durable and easy to be assessed, property 
tax is the most reliable tax of local governments that generates sustainable tax 
revenue through the lifetime of property.    In the case of America, property tax is on 
an ad valorem basis, with a rate determined by an estimated budget of providing 
local public services, education and other human services.  Hence, a fiscal balance 
could maintain.  In urban China, the current system exempts residential property 
from taxes during possession.  Such system violates the “who-use-who-pay” 
principle.  During possession, urban residents use public services without paying 
user fees, causing potential fiscal insufficiency in the future.  Some may argue that 
home owners have already paid for public services through many taxes and fees 
when they bought their houses, and local governments should use the revenue to 
finance future services such as police, fire protection, and local schools.    However, 
without a linkage between the revenue and expenditure, it is difficult to save current 
tax revenue for future expenses and services.    For instance, in order to acquire high 
achievement during tenure, government officials tend to carry out big projects, using 
out available capital and leaving little to the successors.   
China’s current property system also lacks of mechanism to capture the 
increment of property value, which would help to generate more tax revenue.  It 
hasn’t resulted in serious problems so far, because the housing market is still 
 11 
booming with housing price and number of transactions increasing every year.    But 
in the near future, the housing market will get saturated and transactions will slow 
down.  On one side, proportionally, fewer and fewer new houses will be built.  
Thus, the tax base will diminish and government tax revenue will decrease.    On the 
other side, due to fast urbanization and inflation of material and service price over 
time, local governments face with rising responsibilities and average cost for the 
provision of public services.  The gap between revenue and spending could get 
larger as time goes by, making fiscal balance impossible.    In the future, China either 
provides less public service or asks urban residents to pay more property taxes. 
 
III. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the discussion above, we propose a general framework of China’s 
property tax reform that is to create an ad valorem property tax during the holding 
period of property and reduce or eliminate some of the existing taxes and fees in 
construction and transaction phases.  In principle, three characteristics of property 
tax make it a “good tax.”    First, it is impartial and fair because property tax reflects 
the taxation principles of “ability-to-pay” and “who-use-who-pay.”  Occupants of 
more valuable housing have greater ability to pay taxes due to higher income than 
those who live in less valuable housing.  Householders who demand more local 
public services pay higher property tax than those who demand fewer public services.   
In addition, recent studies have shown that property tax is neither regressive nor 
progressive (Goodman, 2005; Plummer, 2003).  Second, property tax is relatively easy 
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to manage and thus administratively efficient.    Real property is attached to land and 
unmovable.  It is easy to identify and record information and collect tax payment.  
Third, property tax is sustainable.  During the long lifespan of real property, it 
generates revenue in according to the assessed value of property every year, rather 
than a one-time income.  Empirical data also show that property tax revenue 
increases proportionally with GDP, confirming the sustainability of property tax. 
Using 1988-2005 data on property tax revenue (PTR) and GDP,
11 we ran a 
regression model on these two variables and obtained the following results:   
     (1) 
with an adjusted R
2-value of 0.979 and t-stat of 27.87 for the estimated elasticity, 
suggesting an excellent overall fitness and a high significance.  The estimated 
elasticity of 0.9982, very close to 1, indicates that property tax revenue increases 
proportionally with GDP, further confirming the sustainability of property tax. 
() ( ) GDP PTR ln 9982 . 0 59 . 3 ln + − =
Specifically, we recommend that China converts most one-time lump sum 
taxes and fees into taxes that are collected on an annual basis over the entire property 
possession period.  Taxes and fees that finance local public services, such as 
education, police, fire protection, public infrastructure construction and maintenance, 
public transportation, water and drainage system, heat and electricity system, as well 
as child and senior services, should be part of the proposed property taxes.  Based 
on the characteristics of each tax, at least city maintenance and construction tax and 
city infrastructure fee need to be eliminated and combined into the standard property 
tax. 
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Land-use fee should also be a part of the property tax and collected on an 
annual basis.  Land in urban China is leased to users for 70 years and thus 
home-owners only have land-use right.    Charging a one-time lump sum fee not only 
disobeys the economic principle of rent but also double taxes home-buyers.    Once a 
developer acquires a piece of land, a 5.5 percent business tax and a 4 percent title tax 
are levied with land leasehold charge as the tax base.    The tax payment in turn goes 
to land cost and becomes a part of housing price.    In transactions, home-buyers pay 
taxes based on housing price, being double taxed on the land leasehold charge (Wang, 
2005).    Converting land-use fee from a one-time lump-sum payment into an annual 
user-fee will greatly reduce housing price, lower tax burden, and make urban 
housing more affordable. 
We also recommend that China continues its efforts to reduce and eliminate 
taxes and fees on urban housing.  On January 2, 1997, the central government 
eliminated 48 categories of taxes and fees that had been charged inappropriately by 
local governments (Song et al., 1999).  Still, there are too many taxes and fees, 
which together contribute 20 percent to urban housing price.  For example, China 
could reduce title tax and assessment fee, combine taxes (such as contract stamp tax, 
certificate stamp tax, registration fee, and certificate fee of ownership), and eliminate 
some fees such as mapping fee and maintenance fee.     
The primary goal of suggested property tax reform is to increase housing 
affordability for urban residents.    By converting most taxes and fees into an annual 
property tax, housing price can be significantly reduced.    To exam the effect of such 
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reform, we assume the housing price with no property tax to be 1 and would drop to 
 with property tax rate t and discount rate r.  The model that predicts   is 
as follows: 
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For a 70-year land lease, N in Equation (2) is from 0 to 69 and the equation 
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Equations (3) and (4) can be used to estimate the reduction of housing price 
under different tax rates for infinite lifetime and 70-year lifetime, respectively.  
Assume discount rate to be 4.5 percent, the prevalent 10-year interest rate in China, 
Table 3 shows   and price reduction for both N of infinite and 70 years.  It is 
obvious that the higher property tax rate is levied on residences, the more housing 
new P
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price will decrease.  Under the same tax rate, housing price decreases more when 
the lifetime of the house is longer.   
 
<INSERT TABLE 3 HERE> 
 
The results in Table 3 suggest that housing will be more affordable after the 
property tax reform even with the same present value of total housing expenditure. 
That is because house-buyers could trade off between a higher current housing price 
and future annual property tax payments.    Life-cycle consumption is thus improved 
and so is residents’ welfare.  For example, a property tax of 2 percent with a 50 
percent degree of capitalization of the property tax would lower China’s national 
average P/I ratio from current 7.3 to 6.2.  If the property tax rate were 3 percent, 
new P/I ratio would become 5.9. 
If, besides levying property tax on an annual basis, China could reduce and 
eliminate unreasonable charges and at the same time make the real estate market 
more competitive and transparent, housing price could be further reduced.  To 
investigate price cut potential, we assume that profit rate is lowered by 15 percent 
from 37 percent to 12 percent, share of taxes and fees in price is reduced by 10 
percent from 20 percent to 10 percent, a property tax of 2 percent is levied, and 
degree of capitalization of the property tax in housing price is 50 percent.  Under 
these conservative assumptions, housing price could be reduced by 36.5 percent as it 
can be calculated by 1 – [(1-15%-10%) * (1-30.71% * 50%)] = 36.5%.  No  doubt, 
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China has a big room to decrease urban housing price and improve housing 
affordability. 
Our proposed property tax reform also will help local fiscal system.  In the 
USA, property tax is the most important single tax and the second largest source of 
revenue for local governments.  It generates on average a third of total state and 
local governments’ tax revenue and more than half of local governments’ tax revenue 
for decades.  In China, after tax system reform in 1994, local governments are 
neither able to receive enough tax income due to losing the independence in taxation 
nor can they be dependable on internal transfer from the central government (Ma, 
2005 ).  Table 4 shows that the percentage of local government tax income among 
national total tax income decreased from 73.9 percent in 1991 to 41.4 percent in 
2004.  
 
<INSERT TABLE 4 HERE> 
 
With relatively less revenue while taking on even more responsibilities, local 
governments are encouraged to seek more off-budget revenue sources.  Land 
leasehold charge is one of the favorite off-budget revenue sources of local 
governments, due to its quickness, large size and profitability as well as it doesn’t 
have to be under the supervision of the central government.  Local governments 
thus are greatly attracted to lease out public land in order to earn easy money in short 
term, regardless of the outcomes this action may cause.  Land leasehold charge 
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contributed 35 percent of total income of local governments during 2001-2003.   
This ratio increased to 47 percent in 2004 after the central government commanded 
public auction of land.  It is estimated to exceed 50 percent in 2006 (Gao and Wu, 
2006).  Land leasehold charge has become “the second finance” of local 
governments.  The flourish of off-budget revenues causes a big fiscal mess and 
hardship of management.  Macro regulations, which use taxes as instrument, are 
hard to achieve expected goals because of the insignificance of taxes in the fiscal 
system.  Further more, without a clear definition of off-budget incomes and fiscal 
transparency, it encourages governmental corruption and imposes excessive burdens 
on  citizens.      
Therefore, property tax reform should be considered as an important step to 
formalize China’s local government financial system.  On one hand, the property 
tax has a large and stable tax base.   It generates revenue at the rate of GDP growth 
and has the capability to provide local governments with sufficient and stable 
income as economy develops.  Also, taxation and administration cost for property 
tax is relatively low.  All these make property tax an ideal tax type that can save 
local governments from future tax income shortage.  On the other hand, 
consolidation of several real estate taxes and fees into a uniform tax would be able to 
move many off-budget items into the formal budget, relieving the mess of current 
fiscal system and making the central government management easier.  Collecting 
tax payment on an annual basis would also be able to prevent local governments 
from leasing out all public land in a short period, thereby regulating their short-term 
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fiscal behavior to help avoiding future fiscal insufficiency. 
With the reform, property tax revenue would replace land leasehold charge to 
become the main reliance of government finances.  It is inevitable that some local 
governments could have temporary fiscal shortages due to the postponement of tax 
collection during possession instead of a lump sum income at transaction.    However, 
it would not necessarily run into a deficit, because local government can issue 
municipal bonds to finance the temporary shortage.  Issuing municipal bonds is a 
common way for local governments in the USA to raise funds for short-term deficit 
or governmental projects.  Future property tax revenue can be used to pay off the 
obligations. 
We would recommend that property tax be levied on city basis to assure 
fairness and efficiency.  Differences among cities in China are large.  If property 
tax were collected at the provincial level, it is harder to balance between demands for 
local public services and willingness of local residents to pay for them.    Allocation 
of tax revenue among cities would be a problem, too.  Interest groups with 
diversified needs would fight for more funds and blame each other for taking away 
“their” money.  They would complain the provincial government of the unfair 
allocation.    In the USA, property tax is collected at the county level, as an outcome 
of long-time evolution.    China may learn from the US experience. 
It should be mentioned that our proposed property tax should take effect only 
on new residential property.    Old houses have paid for the taxes and fees, as a share 
of housing prices thus should not be included in the reform.    As a result, tax base of 
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the property tax is expected to be small at the beginning of the reform.    However, as 
more newly built residences are added into the housing market every year, tax base 
will expand and property tax revenue will rise quickly due to both the tax base 
expansion and property value appreciation. 
Our proposed property reform will facilitate China to implement its macro 
policies in relation to urban housing sector.  Since 2003, the Chinese central 
government has been devoting to housing market macro regulations, promulgating a 
series of documents regarding all aspects of the housing market.  As the situation 
changed under the effect of regulations, the attention of the central government has 
gradually switched from limiting fixed assets investment to current improving basic 
housing demand of urban residents.    For instance, on March 26, 2005, a Document 
for keeping price of residential houses stable was issued, which focuses on 
increasing the housing affordability of urban residents with average income or 
below.
12  The document requires local governments to adjust housing supply 
structure and offer more economic housing.  Soon after, another document of 
adjusting housing supply structure and stabilizing housing price was issued on May 
29, 2006, reemphasizing the previous requirement.
13    It comes up with the specific 
guideline that starts from June 1, 2006, houses below 90 square meters in size should 
account for 70 percent of total amount of all newly developed housing.   
While government policies focused mostly on the supply side of housing 
market, our proposed property tax can be used as a demand side adjustor, which can 
be a supplemental regulation tool to fulfill government’s macro policies.    Collected 
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based on assessed value, the property tax itself can dampen the willingness of 
holding a house vacant for speculation or investment.  Also, disparities of housing 
conditions between the rich and ordinary residents can be narrowed if property tax is 
levied progressively.    A preferential tax rate can be offered to economic housing to 
encourage self-using demand.  A higher tax rate can be imposed on luxury 
residences.  Exemptions or special benefits can be offered to selected groups of 
residents to increase their affordability and willingness to improve living conditions.   
In short, property tax can be utilized as an effective way to lower speculative 
housing demand and improve equality. 
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has discussed the current real estate tax system in urban China 
and its inefficiency.  Under the current real estate tax system, property owners pay 
taxes for the property they own and the land they borrow from the state respectively 
due to the separation of use-right and ownership of urban land.  Too many taxes 
and fees are charged in phases of construction and transaction, which together push 
housing price up by 20 percent.  During possession, however, no property tax is 
levied.    We argued that such property tax system is inefficient because the high tax 
and fee cost plus the one time lump-sum land leasehold charge dramatically increase 
the housing price and thus make urban housing unaffordable to ordinary households.   
Zero property tax during possession loses the role of property tax to adjust resource 
allocation.    It also encourages speculation in housing market and leads to inefficient 
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use of residential property.  Zero property tax during possession not only violates 
the “who-use-who-pay” principle but also causes fiscal insufficiency for Chinese 
local governments in the future.     
Therefore, we propose a general framework of China’s property tax reform 
that is to create an ad valorem property tax during the holding period of property as 
well as reduce or eliminate some of the existing taxes and fees in construction and 
transaction  phases.  Specifically,  we  recommend that China converts most one-time 
lump sum taxes and fees, including the land leasehold charge, into taxes that are 
collected on an annual basis over the entire property possession period.    Meanwhile, 
China should continue its efforts to reduce and eliminate taxes and fees on urban 
housing.  The primary goals of our proposed property tax reform are to increase 
housing affordability for urban residents, help to formalize local fiscal system and 
facilitate the Chinese government to implement its macro policies in relation to 
urban housing sector.   
Several questions have not been fully resolved in this paper.  What tax rate 
is appropriate?  What exact off-budget fees can be cancelled or reduced?  What 
taxes and fees can be consolidated into the proposed property tax?    Should the land 
leasehold charge and residential property tax be combined?  By what percentage 
will the property tax be partially capitalized in property value?  How do Chinese 
cities collect new property tax from new houses and avoid double taxing on existing 
home?  Should houses built and sold before the property reform ever be taxed?  
Should China provide any income tax incentives to encourage home ownership?  
 22 
These questions call for future research and need to be answered in the process of 
property tax reform, in according to economic principles of property tax as well as 
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Amount ($)  Percent 
House Price 2200-3100 275-387.5 100%
Land Cost  600-900  75-112.  27%-29% 
Taxes and Fees  400-600  25-37.5  20% 
Construction Cost  700-800  87.5-100  26%-32% 
 24 
Profit  340-600  42.5-75  15%-20% 
Data Source: www.hexun.com
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TABLE 2   
House Price to Income Ratio of China Major 37 Cities in 2004 
City 
Average Housing




Income ($)  P/I 
Wenzhou  1160 81183  7098  11.4 
Shanghai  1078 75486  6680  11.3 
Hangzhou  901 63088 5832  10.8 
Beijing  779 54530 6262  8.7 
Shenzhen  755 52824 11050  4.8 
Ningbo  738 51625 6359  8.1 
Guangzhou  708 49525 6760  7.3 
Xiamen  645 45115 5783  7.8 
Nanjing  620 43400 4646  9.3 
Tianjin  595 41650 4591  9.1 
Qingdao  580 40591 4440  9.1 
Suzhou  558 39025 5786  6.7 
Dalian  530 37109 4155  8.9 
Fuzhou  421 29470 4579  6.4 
Jinan  397 27755 4807  5.8 
Kunming  394 27563 3622  7.6 
Guiyang  388 27125 3599  7.5 
Taiyuan  381 26688 3745  7.1 
Xian  376 26311 3421  7.7 
Shenyang  366 25603 3556  7.2 
Chengdu  359 25095 4162  6.0 
Wuhan  357 25008 3830  6.5 
Changsha  353 24719 4413  5.6 
Nanning  352 24649 3227  7.6 
Nanchang  347 24299 3480  7.0 
Chongqing  342 23905 3692  6.5 
Zhengzhou  331 23188 3749  6.2 
Haerbin  322 22523 3580  6.3 
Shijiazhuang  309 21613 3452  6.3 
Lanzhou  305 21333 3077  6.9 
Haikou  291 20388 3596  5.7 
Wulumuqi  285 19950 3896  5.1 
Hefei  278 19425 3448  5.6 
Changchun  274 19171 3564  5.4 
Huhehaote  245 17150 4071  4.2 
Yinchuan  241 16888 3197  5.3 
Xining  228 15934 3054  5.2 
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Average  475 33268 4547  7.3 
Data Sources: China Statistical Year Book (2005); Personal Finance (Ge Ren Li 
Cai), Ranking of Average House Price and Per Capita Income in Major 37 Cities of 
China. 
a Average size of residence is assumed to be 70 square meters. Average House 
Price = Average Price/ 70. 
b Average Household Income data are estimated based on Average Household 
Per Capita Disposable Income. Average number of household member was 2.98 in 
2004; disposable income accounts for 93 percent of total income, data available from 
China Statistical Year Book 2005. Average Household Income = Average Household 





House Price Changes Prediction under Property Tax Rate t (r = 4.5%) 
t  P new (N=70)  Change (N=70)  P new (N=infinite) Change (N=infinite)
0.5% 90.03%  9.97%  89.60%  10.40% 
1.0% 81.86%  18.14%  81.15%  18.85% 
1.5% 75.06%  24.94%  74.17%  25.83% 
2.0% 69.29%  30.71%  68.29%  31.71% 
2.5% 64.35%  35.65%  63.27%  36.73% 
3.0% 60.07%  39.93%  58.94%  41.06% 
3.5% 56.32%  43.68%  55.16%  44.84% 
4.0% 53.02%  46.98%  51.84%  48.16% 









Tax Revenue Sharing between the Central and Local Governments 
Data Sources: China Statistical Year Book (2002-2005), Ma (2005). 
Year  Central Government Share (%)  Local Government Share (%) 
1991 26.1  73.9 
1992 25.9  74.1 
1993 20.8  79.2 
1994 55.2  44.8 
1995 53.1  46.9 
1996 50.1  49.9 
1997 51.4  48.6 
1998 49.5  50.5 
1999 51.1  48.9 
2000 52.2  47.8 
2001 54.9  45.1 
2002 58.0  42.0 
2003  58.0 42.0 




                                                        
1  “Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Fang Chan Shui Zan Xing Tiao Li.” 
2  “Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Cheng Zhen Tu Di Shi Yong Shui Zan Xing 
Tiao Li”. 
3  Data is obtained from “Announcement As To 2006 Urban Employer Average 
Annual Income,” issued by National Bureau of Statistics of China on March 22, 
2007,  http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjdt/zygg/sjxdtzgg/t20070323_402393903.htm. 
4  Data are obtained from “2005 China Real Estate Industry Research Report” from 
www.hounews.com. 
5  “House Price Composition of China,” hexun web, 03/11/2006. 
6  “Guo You Tu Di Shi Yong Quan Chu Rang He Tong.” 
7  Data are obtained from “Residential Housing Cost List” by journalists Chen, Fang, 
Song, Zhenyuan, Shen, Rufa, issued on www.xinhuanet.com on August 24, 2005. 
8  Data are obtained from Nanjing Price Bureau, “Residential Property Pricing,” 
2003. 
9  Data are obtained from: Viva Las Vegas Housing, by Blanche Evans, 2005. 
10  Data are obtained from “2004 China Real Estate Finance Report” issued by the 
People Bank of China. 
11  PTR data are obtained from U.S. Census Bureau publication: National Totals of 
State and Local Tax Revenue, By Type of Tax. GDP data are used instead of 
GNP, due to the unavailability of GNP data. Data are obtained from U.S. 
Bureau of Economic Analysis data: Current-Dollar and “Real” Gross Domestic 
Product. 
12  “Guan Yu Qie Shi Wen Ding Zhu Fang Jia Ge de Tong Zhi,” briefly called Guo 8 
Tiao. 
13  “Guan Yu Tiao Zheng Zhu Fang Gong Ying Jie Gou Wen Ding Zhu Fang Jia Ge 






RMB:  Ren Min Bi 
GDP:  Gross Domestic Product 
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